In a significant and welcome change from the SEC’s proposal, the agency will not mandate cooling-off periods for 10b5-1 plans used for corporate stock buybacks. For plan use by directors, officers and other insiders, the rules add cooling-off periods and mandate new disclosures. The rules also include new disclosure requirements for option grants and stock gifts.
On December 14, 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted new rules focused on Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangements and other securities transactions involving corporate insiders, including directors and officers. In many respects the new rules track the agency’s proposals from a year ago, although the SEC responded to certain concerns raised by commenters, yielding what we consider to be an improved set of changes to its rulebook over the original version. In particular, the SEC did not adopt changes that would have unnecessarily interfered with corporate stock repurchase programs, such as a proposed 30-day cooling-off period for issuer use of the Rule 10b5-1 safe harbor.
Chair Gensler deserves credit for shepherding the proposals through a constructive rulemaking process and achieving unanimous support from his fellow commissioners on a complex subject that easily could have splintered along partisan lines. Heading into the new year, we are optimistic that the SEC may take a similarly pragmatic approach to some of the other consequential items pending on its rulemaking agenda, including additional rules governing stock buybacks and climate risk disclosures.
The final rules are effective on February 27, 2023. Except where noted below, the rules apply to all SEC registrants, including foreign private issuers.
What to do now. Companies should consider revising their Rule 10b5-1 guidelines and insider trading policies to account for the new mandated cooling-off periods, restrictions and certification requirements discussed below.
Rule 10b5-1 offers a defense to the charge of illegal insider trading for securities transactions executed according to a plan entered into when the trader does not have material nonpublic information, or MNPI, about the company. Because they frequently hold MNPI, directors, officers and other company insiders often use Rule 10b5-1 trading plans to sell and buy stock, and companies themselves often use the plans when conducting stock buybacks. Properly used, Rule 10b5-1 trading plans help companies and insiders avoid running afoul of insider trading laws when engaging in everyday stock transactions. Nevertheless, over the years academic studies and investigative journalists have suggested that some insiders may use Rule 10b5-1 trading plans for the opposite purpose: to facilitate illegal insider trading.
Although the SEC’s enforcement program has never uncovered a wide pattern of such abuse, the SEC is adopting the following major changes to make sure it doesn’t happen.
Rule 10b5-1 as currently in effect does not impose any waiting period between the time a plan is adopted or amended and the date of the first trade under the plan. The amended rule changes that as follows:
In another helpful change from the original proposal, only certain types of plan modifications will trigger a new cooling-off period. Modifications that do not change the pricing, amount of securities or timing of trades will not trigger a new cooling-off period. The final rule would also not treat as a modification instances where a broker executing trades on behalf of the insider under Rule 10b5-1 is substituted by a different broker so long as the purchase or sales instructions remain the same.
The final rule restricts anyone other than companies themselves from using multiple overlapping plans, although the SEC improved its original proposal in several ways, including the following:
Rule 10b5-1 would be available for only one “single trade” plan entered into by an insider during any 12-month period. In support of the limitation, the SEC cited a study that found that trades under such a plan “avoid losses that appear statistically unlikely to be avoided by uninformed traders” even where the trade occurs more than 120 days after plan adoption. The single-trade limitation also allows sell-to-cover transactions, mirroring the accommodation described above in the context of overlapping plans.
The SEC did not adopt limitations as proposed on multiple plans and single-trade plans for companies themselves.
Consistent with the proposed rule, the final rule provides that upon adopting a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan, an officer or director would be required to certify to the company in writing that they are not aware of MNPI and that they are adopting the plan in good faith and not as part of a plan to evade the prohibition against illegal insider trading. Unlike the proposed rule, however, the final rule requires these certifications to be included as representations under the Rule 10b5-1 plan rather than a separate document provided to the issuer, and does away with a problematic recordkeeping requirement that was included in the proposed rule.
Currently Rule 10b5-1 trading plans must be adopted in good faith. The proposed rule would have added a requirement that they also be “operated” in good faith. The final rule requires instead that the person (including an issuer) who has adopted a Rule 10b5-1 plan must act in good faith with respect to the plan, and applies the requirement from the time of adoption through the duration of the plan. But because the distinction between operation of a plan in good faith and acting in good faith with respect to a plan is not clear, we think that this nevertheless raises questions around an insider’s ability to terminate a plan, as well as the insider’s later participation in authorizing corporate disclosure decisions.
There is currently no requirement to publicly disclose the adoption, amendment or termination of a trading plan, and disclosure practice is mixed. In addition, companies are not currently required to publicly disclose the details of their insider-trading policies, and most do not. The final rule adds disclosure requirements for both and applies whether or not trading plans are entered into pursuant to Rule 10b5-1.
Unlike the rule proposal, the final rule does not require disclosure of pricing terms.
The final rule also requires a company to disclose whether a trading arrangement is a Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangement or not, defines what qualifies as a non-Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangement and requires disclosure of the adoption or termination of such arrangements. The SEC definition of a non-Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangement is broad, and could potentially pick up any sale of securities by such officer or director.
In line with other aspects of the final rule, the SEC did not adopt its proposal to require disclosure of the use of trading arrangements by the company, and the disclosure obligations do not extend to traders other than officers or directors. However, the final rule does not exempt officers and directors of smaller reporting companies from the disclosure requirements.
Although the quarterly disclosure of trading plans discussed above does not apply to foreign private issuers, the annual disclosure of insider-trading policies does. The SEC also highlighted in the adopting release that these disclosures will be subject to the certifications required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, requiring principal executive and financial officers to attest to the accuracy of the statements in Form 10-K or Form 20-F, as applicable (although the SEC does not reference Form 10-Q, the same point can be made for quarterly reports).
Under existing rules, Section 16 insiders (officers, directors and 10% shareholders) are generally required to report changes in beneficial ownership of equity securities within two business days of the transaction, on Form 4. However, they may wait to report certain transactions, including bona fide gifts (both acquisitions and dispositions) until 45 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year, by filing a Form 5.
The final rule, which was adopted as proposed, instead requires Section 16 insiders to report the donation (but not receipt) of company equity securities on Form 4 within two business days. The requirement covers all recipients, including family members, trusts and other estate planning vehicles and Section 501(c)(3) charitable organizations. The SEC reiterated its view that the reporting change is to allow investors to evaluate gift transactions in light of potential “problematic” practices, including stock gifts while the donor is in possession of MNPI, or backdating stock gifts to maximize the donor’s tax benefit. Insiders may wish to plan their year-end gift-giving for 2023 early to manage the associated compliance and administrative burdens.
Although we had raised this concern in our comment letter, the SEC did not address its claim in the proposing release that a donor of securities violates insider trading laws if the donor, “in fraudulent breach of a duty of trust and confidence,” gifts securities when the donor was aware of MNPI and knew or was reckless in not knowing that the donee would sell the securities prior to the public disclosure of the MNPI. This language appears to represent an extension of existing insider trading law that calls into question the commonplace activity of year-end gifting while in a company blackout period, and the SEC does not cite judicial precedent or other authority for this proposition. While the SEC suggests that the affirmative defense is available when a donor gifts under a Rule 10b5-1 plan, it still leaves unclear what it believes to be a violation, or a gift “in fraudulent breach of a duty of trust and confidence.” Absent future clarification on the point, we are left wondering if the SEC’s view is that a gift outside a Rule 10b5-1 plan but in compliance with a company’s insider trading policy by a donor who may be aware of MNPI could potentially violate insider trading laws.
Currently, Section 16 insiders can voluntarily disclose whether a transaction reported on Form 4 or Form 5 was made pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan. Insiders often disclose the existence of a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan this way in order to dampen any inference that the transaction (usually a sale) reflects the insider’s views of the company’s near-term prospects.
The final rule adds a mandatory checkbox to Forms 4 and 5 indicating whether the transaction was intended to satisfy the affirmative defense conditions under, rather than made (as formulated in the proposal), pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan to address a concern around reporting persons having to make the determination about whether the transaction was in fact made pursuant to the plan. The SEC did not adopt the optional checkbox that would allow an insider to indicate whether the transaction was made under an instruction or arrangement that is not designed to satisfy Rule 10b5-1 as it was persuaded by commenters that such an optional checkbox would not add to the information already disclosed in the relevant form.
As proposed, the final rule targets company practices that time option grants around the release of MNPI, with a focus on so-called “spring-loaded” and “bullet-dodging” option grants. The final rule requires a company to provide narrative disclosure in the proxy statement about its option granting policies and practices regarding the timing of option grants and the release of MNPI, including how the board determines when to grant options and whether and how MNPI is taken into account. Although foreign private issuers would not be subject to this new disclosure requirement, smaller reporting companies and emerging growth companies are not exempt.
The final rule requires companies to provide annual proxy statement disclosure of each award of stock options, stock appreciation rights or similar awards that the company granted during the prior year to its named executive officers made in the four business days before the filing of a periodic report (Form 10-K or 10-Q) or reporting of MNPI on Form 8-K (including earnings, but excluding a Form 8-K that is filed to disclose a material option grant under Item 5.02(e)) and ending one business day after a triggering event (narrowing the 14 calendar-day window before or after such filing or reporting in the proposed rule, or what was effectively a period of 28 calendar days for each issuance of MNPI).
Disclosure will still be required in tabular format (though somewhat more simplified than in the proposed rule), tagged in Inline XBRL, and must include for each named executive officer, on an-award-by-award basis:
Unlike the rule proposal, the final rule removes adoption of a stock buyback plan as a disclosure trigger.